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Predatory Trading
MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER and LASSE HEJE PEDERSEN∗
ABSTRACT
This paper studies predatory trading, trading that induces and/or exploits the need of
otherinvestorstoreducetheirpositions.Weshowthatifonetraderneedstosell,others
also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price overshooting and a
reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence, the market is illiquid when
liquidity is most needed. Further, a trader profits from triggering another trader’s
crisis, and the crisis can spill over across traders and across markets.
LARGE TRADERS FEAR A FORCED LIQUIDATION, especially if their need to liquidate is
known by other traders. For example, hedge funds with (nearing) margin calls
may need to liquidate, and this could be known to certain counterparties such
as the bank financing the trade. Similarly, traders who use portfolio insurance,
stop loss orders, or other risk management strategies can be known to liquidate
in response to price drops; a short-seller may need to cover his position if the
price increases significantly or if his share is recalled (i.e., a “short squeeze”);
certain institutions have an incentive to liquidate bonds that are downgraded
or in default; and, intermediaries who take on large derivative positions must
hedge them by trading the underlying security. A forced liquidation is often
very costly since it is associated with large price impact and low liquidity.
We provide a new framework for studying the strategic interaction among
large traders who have market impact. Traders trade continuously and limit
their trading intensity to minimize temporary price impact costs. Some of the
traders may end up in financial difficulty, and the resulting need to liquidate
is known by the other strategic traders.
Our analysis shows that if a distressed large investor is forced to unwind his
position (i.e., when he needs liquidity the most), other strategic traders initially
trade in the same direction. That is, to profit from price swings, other traders
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conduct predatory trading and withdraw liquidity instead of providing it. This
predatory activity makes liquidation costly and leads to price overshooting.
Moreover, predatory trading can even induce the distressed trader’s need to
liquidate; hence, predatory trading can enhance the risk of financial crisis. We
show that predation is profitable if the market is illiquid and if the distressed
trader’s position is large relative to the buying capacity of other traders. Fur-
ther, predation is most fierce if there are few predators.
These findings are in line with anecdotal evidence as summarized in Table I.
A well-known example is the alleged trading against Long Term Capital Man-
agement’s (LTCM’s) positions in the fall of 1998. Business Week wrote:
...if lenders know that a hedge fund needs to sell something quickly,
theywillsellthesameasset—drivingthepricedownevenfaster.Goldman,
Sachs & Co. and other counterparties to LTCM did exactly that in 1998.1
Cramer (2002, p. 182) describes hedge funds’ predatory intentions in colorful
terms:
When you smell blood in the water, you become a shark....when you
know that one of your number is in trouble...you try to figure out what
he owns and you start shorting those stocks...
Also, Cai (2002) finds that “locals” on the Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE)
pits exploited knowledge of LTCM’s short positions in the treasury bond fu-
tures market. Another indication of the fear of predatory trading is evident in
the opposition to UBS Warburg’s proposal to take over Enron’s traders without
takingoveritstradingpositions.Thisproposalwasopposedonthegroundsthat
“it would present a ‘predatory trading risk’ because Enron’s traders would ef-
fectively know the contents of the trading book.”2 Similarly, many institutional
investorsareforcedbylawortheirownchartertosellbondsofcompanieswhich
undergo debt restructuring procedures. Hradsky and Long (1989), for example,
documentspriceovershootinginthebondmarketafterdefaultannouncements.
Furthermore, our model shows that an adverse wealth shock to one large
trader, coupled with predatory trading, can lead to a price drop that brings
other traders into financial difficulty, leading in turn to further predation, and
so on. This ripple effect can cause a widespread crisis in the financial sector. Ac-
cordingly,thetestimonyofAlanGreenspanintheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives
on October 1, 1998 indicates that the Federal Reserve Bank was worried that
LTCM’s financial difficulties might destabilize the financial system as a whole:
...the act of unwinding LTCM’s portfolio would not only have a sig-
nificant distorting impact on market prices but also in the process could
produce large losses, or worse, for a number of creditors and counterpar-
ties,andforothermarketparticipantswhowerenotdirectlyinvolvedwith
LTCM.3
1 “The Wrong Way to Regulate Hedge Funds,” Business Week,F e b r u a r y2 6 ,2 0 01, p.9 0 .
2 AFX News Limited, AFX—Asia, January 18, 2002.
3 Testimony of Alan Greenspan, U.S. House of Representatives, October 1, 1998, http://www.
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Also, the Brady Report (Brady et al. (1988), p. 15) suggests that the 1987 stock
market crash was partly due to predatory trading in the spirit of our model:
...This precipitous decline began with several “triggers,” which ignited
mechanical, price-insensitive selling by a number of institutions following
portfolio insurance strategies and a small number of mutual fund groups.
The selling by these investors, and the prospect of further selling by them,
encouraged a number of aggressive trading-oriented institutions to sell in
anticipation of further declines. These aggressive trading-oriented insti-
tutions included, in addition to hedge funds, a small number of pension
andendowmentfunds,moneymanagementfirmsandinvestmentbanking
houses. This selling in turn stimulated further reactive selling by portfolio
insurers and mutual funds.
Predationriskaffectstheoptimalriskmanagementstrategyforlargeinstitu-
tionalinvestorswhoholdilliquidassets.Theoptimalriskmanagementstrategy
should depend on the liquidity of the assets and on the positions and financial
standing of other large investors. Indeed, JP Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank
recently developed a “dealer exit stress-test” to assess the risk that a rival is
forced to withdraw from the market (Jeffery (2003)). Further, risk managers
should consider the risk that fund outflows can lead to predatory trading, re-
sulting in losses that could fuel further outflows, and so on. Hence, the more
likely fund outflows are, the more liquid the fund’s asset holdings should be.
The danger of predatory trading might make it impossible for a fund to raise
money in order to temporarily bridge some financial short-falls, since doing
so requires that it reveals its financial need. More generally, the possibility
of predatory trading is an argument against very strict disclosure policy. In
the same spirit, the disclosure guidelines of the IAFE Investor Risk Commit-
tee (IRC) (2001) maintain that “large hedge funds need to limit granularity of
reporting to protect themselves against predatory trading against the fund’s
position.” Likewise, market makers at the London Stock Exchange prefer to
delay the reporting of large transactions since it gives them “a chance to reduce
a large exposure, rather than alerting the rest of the market and exposing them
to predatory trading tactics from others.”4
Our model also provides guidance for the valuation of large security posi-
tions. We distinguish between three forms of value, with increasing emphasis
on the position’s liquidity. Specifically, the “paper value” is the current mark-to-
market value of a position, the “orderly liquidation value” reflects the revenue
one could achieve by secretly liquidating the position, and the “distressed liqui-
dation value” equals the amount which can be raised if one faces predation by
other strategic traders, that is, with endogenous market liquidity. We show that
under certain conditions, the paper value exceeds the orderly liquidation value,
which in turn exceeds the distressed liquidation value. Hence, if a large trader
estimates “impact costs” based on normal (orderly) market behavior, then he
4 Financial Times,J une 5, 1990, section I, p. 12.1828 TheJ ournal of Finance
may underestimate his actual cost in case of an acute need to sell because pre-
dation makes liquidity time-varying. In particular, predation reduces liquidity
when large traders need it the most. Along these lines, Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) find measures of liquidity risk to be
priced.
Our work is related to several strands of literature. First, our model
provides a natural example of “destabilizing speculation” by showing that
although strategic traders stabilize prices most of the time, their predatory
behavior can destabilize prices in times of financial crises. Our model thus con-
tributes to an old debate; see Friedman (1953), Hart and Kreps (1986), DeLong
et al. (1990), and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003). Trading based on private
information about security fundamentals is studied by Kyle (1985), whereas,
in our model, agents trade to profit from their information about the future
order flow coming from the distressed traders. Order flow information is also
studied by Madrigal (1996), Vayanos (2001), and Cao, Evans, and Lyons (2006),
but these papers do not consider the strategic effects of forced liquidation. The
notion of predatory trading partially overlaps with that of stock price manip-
ulation, which is investigated by Allen and Gale (1992) among others. One
distinctive feature of predatory trading is that the predator derives profit from
the price impact of the prey and not from his own price impact. Attari, Mello,
and Ruckes (2002) and Pritsker (2003) are close in spirit to our paper. Pritsker
(2003) also finds price overshooting in an example with heterogeneous risk-
averse traders. Attari et al. (2002) focus, in a two-period model, on a distressed
trader’s incentive to buy in order to temporarily push up the price when fac-
ing a margin constraint, and a competitor’s incentive to trade in the opposite
direction and to lend to this trader. The systemic risk component of our paper
is related to the literature on financial crisis. Bernardo and Welch (2004) pro-
vide a simple model of “financial market runs” in which traders join a run out
of fear of having to liquidate before the price recovers, and Morris and Shin
(2004) study how sales can reinforce sales.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the
model. Section II provides a preliminary result which simplifies the analysis.
Section III derives the equilibrium and discusses the nature of predatory trad-
ing, with both a single and multiple predators. Further, Section III shows how
predation can drive an otherwise solvent trader into financial distress and dis-
cusses implications for risk management. Section IV studies the valuation of
largepositionsinlightofilliquiditycausedbypredation.SectionVconsidersthe
buildup of the traders’ positions and implications of disclosure requirements.
Front-running, circuit breakers, up-tick rule, and contagion are discussed in
Section VI. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Appendix B provides a gener-
alized model with noisy asset supply.
I. Model
We consider a continuous-time economy with two assets, a riskless bond and
a risky asset. For simplicity we normalize the risk-free rate to 0. The risky assetPredatory Trading 1829
has an aggregate supply of S > 0 and a final payoff v at time T, where v is a
random variable5 with an expected value of E(v) = µ. One can view the risky
asset as the payoff associated with an arbitrage strategy consisting of multiple
assets. The price of the risky asset at time t is denoted by p(t). The economy
has two kinds of agents: large strategic traders (arbitrageurs) and long-term
investors. We can think of the strategic traders as hedge funds and proprietary
trading desks, and the long-term investors as pension funds and individual
investors.
Strategic traders, i ∈ {1, 2,...,I }, are risk neutral and seek to maximize
their expected profit. Each strategic trader is large, and hence, his trading
impacts the equilibrium price. He therefore acts strategically and takes his
price impact into account when trading. Each strategic trader i has a given
initial endowment, xi(0), of the risky asset and he can continuously trade the
asset by choosing his trading intensity, ai(t). Hence, at time t his position, xi(t),
in the risky asset is




We assume that each large strategic trader is restricted to hold
xi(t) ∈ [−¯ x,¯ x]. (2)
This position limit can be interpreted more broadly as a risk limit or a capi-
tal constraint. The specific constraint on asset holdings is not crucial for our
results. What is crucial is that strategic traders cannot take unlimited posi-
tions, because if they could, they would drive the price to the expected value
p = µ,atrivial outcome. To consider the case of limited capital, we assume that
¯ xI < S.
Strategic traders are subject to a risk of financial distress at time t0.W e
consider both the case in which an exogenous set of agents is in distress (Sec-
tion III.A) and the case of endogenous distress (Section III.B). In any case, we
denote the set of distressed strategic traders by Id and the set of unaffected
strategic traders, the “predators,” by I p. Similarly, the number of distressed
traders is Id and the number of predators is Ip.Astrategic trader in financial
distress must liquidate his position in the risky asset, that is,





I if x(t) > 0 and t > t0
ai(t) = 0i f x(t) = 0 and t > t0
ai(t) ≥ A
I if x(t) < 0 and t > t0
(3)
where A ∈ R is related to the market structure described below. This statement
says that a distressed trader must liquidate his position at least as fast as A/I
until he reaches his final position xi(T) = 0. Below we show that this is the
5 All random variables are defined on a probability space ( , F, P).1830 TheJ ournal of Finance
fastest rate at which an agent can liquidate without risking temporary price
impact costs.6
The assumption of forced liquidation can be explained by (external or in-
ternal) agency problems. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) show that an optimal
financial contract may leave an agent cash constrained even if the agent is
subject to predation risk.7 Also, the need to liquidate can be the result of a com-
pany’s own risk management policy. We note that our results do not depend
qualitatively on the nature of the troubled agents’ liquidation strategy, nor do
they depend on the assumption that such agents must liquidate their entire
position. It suffices that a troubled large trader must reduce his position before
time T.
In addition to the strategic traders, the market is populated by long-term
investors. The long-term traders are price-takers and have, at each point in




(µ − p), (4)
depending on the current price p. This demand schedule by long-term traders
is based on two assumptions. First, it is downward sloping since in order to get
long-term traders to hold more of the risky asset, they must be compensated in
terms of lower prices. This could be because of risk aversion or because of insti-
tutionalfrictionsthatmaketheriskyassetlessattractiveforlong-termtraders.
For instance,long-termtradersmaybereluctanttobuycomplicatedderivatives
such as asset-backed securities. (This institutional friction, of course, is what
makes it profitable for strategic traders to enter the market.) A downward
sloping demand curve also arises in a price pressure model ` al aGrossman and
Miller (1988) since the competitive but risk-averse market-making sector is
only willing to absorb the selling pressure at a lower price. Price pressure im-
plies a temporary price decline, and, similarly, in our model the price decline
vanishes at time T. Alternatively, if strategic traders have private information
about the fundamental value v, then the long-term traders face an adverse
selection problem that naturally leads to a downward sloping demand curve
(Kyle (1985)). As in Kyle (1985), λ measures the market liquidity of the risky
asset.8
The second assumption underlying (4) is that long-term traders’ demand
depends only on the current price p. That is, they do not attempt to profit
from price swings. This behavior by the long-term investors is motivated by
6 We will see later that, in equilibrium, a troubled trader who must liquidate maximizes his
profit by liquidating at this speed. Liquidating fast minimizes the costs of front-running by other
traders.
7 Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) consider predation in product markets, not in financial markets.
8 While the long-term traders have a downward sloping demand curve, we shall see that the
strategictraders’actionstendtoflattenthecurve,exceptduringcrisisperiods.Empirically,Shleifer
(1986),ChanandLakonishok(1995),WurglerandZhuravskaya(2002),andothersdocumentdown-
ward sloping demand curves, disputing Scholes (1972) who concludes that the demand curve is
almost flat.Predatory Trading 1831
an assumption that they do not have sufficient information, skills, or time to
predict future price changes.
Thetradingmechanismworksinthefollowingway.Themarketclearingprice






Market clearing and (4) imply that the price is
p(t) = µ − λ(S − X(t)). (6)
Hence, while in the “long term” at time T, the price is expected to be µ,
in the “medium term” the demand curve is downward sloping as described in
(6). Further, in a given instant, that is, “in the very short term,” the strategic
investors do not have immediate access to the entire demand curve (6). As
Longstaff (2001) documents, in the real world one cannot trade infinitely fast in
illiquidmarkets.Tocapturethisphenomenon,weassumethatstrategictraders
can as a whole trade at most A ∈ R shares per time unit at the current price
p(t). Rather than simply assuming that orders beyond A cannot be executed,











  > A. (7)
Orders are executed with equal priority in the sense that trader i incurs a cost
of
G(ai(t), a−i(t)) := γ max
 





















and where a−i(t): = (a1(t), ..., ai−1(t), ai+1(t), ..., aI(t)). In words, ¯ a (a
¯
)i sthe
highest intensity with which trader i can buy (sell) without incurring the cost
associated with a temporary price impact. Further, G is the product of the per-
share cost, γ, multiplied by the number of shares exceeding ¯ a or a
¯
.W eassume
for simplicity that the temporary price impact is large, that is, γ ≥ λI ¯ x.
There are several possible interpretations of this market structure. First, we
can think of a limit order book with a finite depth as follows: each instant,
long-term traders submit A new buy-limit orders and A new sell-limit orders
at the current price level, while old limit orders are canceled. This implies that1832 TheJ ournal of Finance
the depth of the limit order book is always a flow of Adt. Hence, as long as the
strategic traders trade at a total speed lower than A, their orders are absorbed
by the limit order book, new limit orders flow in, and the price walks up or
down the demand curve (6). Orders that exceed A cannot be executed. More
generally, one could assume that such excess orders would hit limit orders far
away from the current price, and consequently suffer temporary impact costs
in line with our model.9
Alternatively, one could interpret the model as an over-the-counter market in
which it takes time to find counterparties. In order to trade, strategic traders
must make time-consuming phone calls to long-term traders. As each strategic
trader goes through his “rolodex”—his list of customer phone numbers ordered
by reservation value—they walk along the demand curve.10 If strategic traders
share the same customer base, they face an aggregate speed constraint in line
with our model. If traders’ customer bases are distinct, the speed constraint is
trader-specific.11
Importantly,ourqualitativeresultsdonotdependonthespecificassumptions
of the model; for example, they also arise in a discrete-time setting. The results
rely on: (i) strategic traders have limited capital, that is, ¯ x << ∞, (otherwise,
the price is always µ = E(v)); and (ii) markets are illiquid in the sense that
large trades move prices (λ>0), and traders avoid trading arbitrarily fast (A <
∞). The latter assumption is relaxed in Section VI. B in which all long-term
traders participate in a batch auction and orders of any size can be executed
immediately.
Strategic trader i’s objective is to maximize his expected wealth subject to the
constraints described above. His wealth is the final value, xi(T)v,o fhis stock
holdings reduced by the cost, ai(t)p(t) + G,o fbuying the shares, where G is the







[ai(t)p(t) + G(ai(t), a−i(t))]dt
 
, (11)
where Ai is the set of feasible trading processes, that is, the {Fi
t}-adapted
piecewise-continuous processes that satisfy (2) and (3). The filtration {Fi
t} rep-
resents trader i’s information. We assume that each strategic trader learns,
at time t0, which traders are in distress. We consider both the case in which
the size of any distressed trader’s position is disclosed at t0 and the case in
9 Our interpretation of the limit order book implicitly assumes that new orders arrive close to the
current price, even if some trader hits limit orders far away from the current price. If new orders
flow in at the last execution price, then hitting orders far away from the current price becomes
even more costly as it permanently moves the price.
10 If the strategic traders must contact the long-term traders in random order, the model needs to
be slightly adjusted, but would qualitatively be the same. Duffie, Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen (2003a,
2003b) provide a search framework for over-the-counter markets.
11 Longstaff (2001) assumes that an agent must choose a limited trading intensity, that is,
|ai(t)|≤constant. Making this assumption separately for each trader would not change our re-
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which it is not. With no disclosure of positions, the filtration {Fi
t} is generated
by Id1(t≥t0).W ith disclosure of positions, the filtration is additionally generated
by xi(t0)1(t≥t0) for i ∈ Id.
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium is a set of feasible processes (a1, ..., aI) such that,
for each i, ai ∈ Ai solves (11), taking a−i = (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., aI) as given.
If investors could learn from the price, then they could essentially infer other
traders’ actions since there is no noise in our model. Assuming that the strate-
gic traders can perfectly observe the actions of other strategic traders seems
unrealistic and complicates the game. Therefore, in Appendix B, we consider
a more general economy with supply uncertainty and show that, even though
traders observe prices, they cannot infer other traders’ actions. For ease of ex-
position, we analyze a setting with the same equilibrium actions but which
abstracts from supply uncertainty; that is, we simply consider a filtration {Fi
t}
that does not include the price and the temporary impact costs. This means
that a trader’s strategy depends on the current time, whether or not he is in
distress, and how many other traders are in distress.12
II. Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we show how to solve a trader’s problem. For this, we rewrite









[λai(t)X −i(t) + G(ai(t), a−i(t))]dt
 
, (12)
where we use E(v) = µ, expression (6) for the price, equation (1), which implies
that
  T
0 ai(t)xi(t)dt = 1
2[xi(t)2]T





Under our standing assumptions, p(t) < E(v)a tany time, and hence, any op-
timal trading strategy satisfies xi(T) = ¯ x if trader i is not in distress. That is,
the trader ends up with the maximum capital in the arbitrage position. Fur-
thermore, it is not optimal to incur the temporary impact cost, that is, each
trader optimally keeps his trading intensity within his bounds a
¯
and ¯ a. These
considerations imply that the trader’s problem can be reduced to minimizing
the third term in (12), which is useful in solving a trader’s optimization problem
and in deriving the equilibrium.
12 If one assumes that prices and temporary impact costs are observable, then our equilibrium
remains a Nash equilibrium since it is optimal to choose a strategy that is a function of time
if everyone else does so. This assumption would, however, raise additional technical issues re-
lated to differential games (see, e.g., Clemhout and Wan (1994)). Also, such an assumption might
lead to multiple equilibria, for instance, because deviations could be detected and followed by a
punishment.1834 TheJ ournal of Finance
LEMMA 1: If T > 2¯ xI/A and X−i ≥ 0, trader i’s problem can be written as
min
ai(·)∈Ai E





s.t. xi(T) = xi(0) +
  T
0
ai(t)dt = ¯ xi f i ∈ I p (15)
ai(t) ∈ [a
¯
(a−i(t)), ¯ a(a−i(t))]. (16)
Note that a distressed trader i ∈ Id must have xi(T) = 0i norder to have a
feasible strategy ai ∈ Ai that satisfies (3). The lemma shows that the trader’s
problem is to minimize
 
ai(t)X −i(t)dt, that is, to minimize his trading cost,
not taking into account his own price impact. This is because the model is
set up such that the trader cannot make or lose money based on the way his
own trades affect prices. (For example, λ is assumed to be constant.) Rather,
the trader makes money by exploiting the way in which the other traders
affect prices (through X−i). This distinguishes predatory trading from price
manipulation.
III. The Predatory Phase (t ∈ [t0, T])
We first consider the “predatory phase,” that is, the period [t0, T]i nwhich
some strategic traders face financial distress. In Section V, we analyze the full
game including the “investment phase” [0, t0)i nwhich traders decide the size
of their initial (arbitrage) positions. We assume that each strategic large trader
has the same position, x(t0) ∈ (0, ¯ x], in the risky asset at time t0. Furthermore,
we assume for simplicity that there is “sufficient” time to trade, that is, t0 +
2¯ xI/A < T.
We proceed in two stages: in Section A, certain traders are already in distress
and we analyze the behavior of the undistressed predators. Section B endog-
enizes agents’ distress and studies how predation and “panic” can lead to a
widespread crisis.
A. Exogenous Distress
Here, we take as given the set of distressed traders, Id, and the common
initial holding, x(t0), of all strategic traders. A distressed trader j sells, in equi-
librium, his shares at constant speed aj =− A/I from t0 until t0 + x(t0)I/A, and
thereafteraj =0.Thisbehaviorisoptimal,aswillbeclearlater.Thisliquidation
strategy is known, in equilibrium, by all the strategic traders.
The predators’ strategies are more interesting. We first consider the simplest
case in which there is a single predator, and we subsequently consider the case
with multiple competing predators.Predatory Trading 1835
A.1. Single Predator (Ip = 1)
In the case with a single predator, the strategic interaction is simple: the
predator, say i,i smerely choosing his optimal trading strategy given the
knownliquidationstrategyofthedistressedtraders.Specifically,thedistressed
traders’ total position, X−i,i sdecreasing to 0, and it is constant thereafter.
Hence, using Lemma 1, we get the following equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1: With Ip = 1, the following describes an equilibrium:13 each dis-
tressed trader sells with constant speed A/If o rτ =
x(t0)
A/I periods. The predator
sells as fast as he can without incurring temporary impact costs for τ time peri-





−A/If o r t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ),
Af o r t ∈
 




0 for t ≥ t0 + τ + ¯ x
A.
(17)





p(t0) − λA[t − t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ),
p(t0) − λIx(t0) + λA[t − (t0 + τ)] for t ∈
 




µ + λ[¯ x − S] for t ≥ t0 + τ + ¯ x
A,
(18)
where p(t0) = µ + λ(Ix(t0) − S).
We see that although the surviving strategic trader wants to end up with all
his capital invested in the arbitrage position (xi(T) = ¯ x), he is selling as long as
theliquidatingtraderisselling.Heissellingtoprofitfromthepriceswingsthat
occur in the wake of the liquidation. The predatory trader would like to “front-
run” the distressed trader by selling before him and buying back shares after
the distressed trader has pushed down the price further. Since both traders can
sell at the same speed, the equilibrium is that they sell simultaneously and the
predator buys back in the end. (The case in which predators can sell earlier
than distressed traders is considered in Section VI.A.)
The selling by the predatory trader leads to price “overshooting.” The price
falls not only because the distressed trader is liquidating, but also because the
predatory trader is selling as well. After the distressed trader is done selling,
the predatory trader starts buying until he is at his capacity ¯ x, and this pushes
the price up toward its new equilibrium level.
The predatory trader profits from the distressed trader’s liquidation for two
reasons.First,thepredatorcansellhisassetsforanaveragepricethatishigher
than the price at which he can buy them back after the distressed trader has
left the market. Second, the predator can buy additional units cheaply until
13 The predator’s profit does not depend on how fast he buys back his shares as long as he does
not incur temporary impact costs and he ends fully invested. Hence, there are other equilibria in
which the predator buys back at a slower rate. These equilibria are, however, qualitatively the
same as the one stated in the proposition, and there are no other equilibria than these.1836 TheJ ournal of Finance
he reaches his capacity. Since the price of the predator’s existing position x(t0)
goes down, the predator may appear to be losing money on a mark-to-market
basis as the liquidation takes place. In the real world, holding a position that
is loosing money on a mark-to-market basis can be problematic and this could
further entice the predator’s selling.
The predatory behavior by the surviving agent makes liquidation excessively
costly for the distressed agent. To see this, suppose a trader estimates the liq-
uidity in “normal times,” that is, when no trader is in distress. The liquidity—as
definedbythepricesensitivitytodemandchanges—isgivenbyλinequation(6).
Whenliquidityisneededbythedistressedtrader,however,theliquidityislower
due to the fact that the market becomes “one-sided” since the predator is selling
as well. Specifically, the price moves by Iλ for each unit the distressed trader
is selling.
The distressed trader’s excess liquidation cost equals the predator’s profit
from preying. Note that the predator does not exploit the group of long-term
investors. The price overshooting implies that long-term investors are buying
and selling shares at the same price. Hence, it does not matter for the group of
long-term investors whether the predator preys or not.14
Numerical example.W e illustrate this predatory behavior with a numerical
example. The supply of the risky asset is S = 40 and there are I = 2 strategic
traders, each of whom has a capacity of ¯ x = 10 shares. At time t0 = 5, each
trader has a position of x(t0) = 8 and Id = 1 trader becomes distressed while
the other trader acts as a predator. At time T = 7 the asset is liquidated with
expected value µ = 140 (or, equivalently, the market becomes perfectly liquid).
Before that time, the price liquidity factor is λ = 1 and A = 20 shares can be
traded per time unit without temporary impact costs.
Figure1(PanelA)illustratestheholdingsofthedistressedtrader:thistrader
starts liquidating his position of 8 shares at time t0 = 5 with a trading intensity
of A/2 = 10 shares per time unit. He is done liquidating at time 5.8. At time
5, the predator knows that this liquidation will take place, and, further, he
realizes that the price will drop in response. Hence, he wants to sell high and
buy back low. The predator optimally sells all his 8 shares simultaneously with
the distressed trader’s liquidation, and, thereafter, he buys back ¯ x = 10 shares
as shown in Figure 1 (Panel B).
Figure 2 shows the price dynamics. The price is falling from time 5 to time
5.8, when both strategic traders are selling. Since 16 shares are sold and λ = 1,
the price drops 16 points, falling to 100. As the predator rebuilds his position
from time 5.8 to time 6.3, the price recovers to 110. Hence, there is a price
overshooting of 10 points.
It is intriguing that the predator is selling even when the price is below its
long-run level 110. This behavior is optimal because, as long as the distressed
14 Recall that even though long-term investors could profit from using a predatory strategy



























Panel A Panel B
Figure 1. Holdings of distressed trader (Panel A) and of single predator (Panel B). Start-
ing with an initial holding of xi(t0) = 8, both traders sell at maximum intensity of A/2 = 10 from
t0 = 5 until t0 +
x(t0)
A/2 = 5.8. By then, the distressed trader has completed his liquidation and sub-
sequently the predator buys back shares.




















Figure 2. Price dynamics with single predator. The price falls as the distressed trader and
the predator sell from time 5 to time 5.8, and rebounds as the predator buys back. The predation
leads to price overshooting and a low liquidation value for the distressed trader—the market is
illiquid when the distressed trader needs liquidity. The dotted line represents the hypothetical
price dynamics if the predator sells one share less, that is, if only the distressed trader sells from
time 5.7 to time 5.8. This hypothetical behavior is not optimal since the last “marginal” share can
be sold at an average price of 101.00 and then can be bought back cheaper at 100.50.1838 TheJ ournal of Finance
trader is selling, the price will drop further and the predator can profit from
selling additional shares and later repurchasing them. To further explain this
point, we consider the predator’s profit if he sells one share less. In this case,
the predator sells 7 shares from time 5 to time 5.7, waits for the distressed
trader to finish selling at time 5.8, and then buys 9 shares from time 5.8 to
time 6.25. The price dynamics in this case are illustrated by the dotted line in
Figure 2. We see that the 9 shares are bought back at the same prices as the
last 9 shares were bought in the case in which the predator continues to sell
as long as the distressed trader does. Hence, to compare the profit in the two
cases, we focus on the price at which the 10th (and last) share is sold and bought
back. This share is sold at prices between 102 and 100, that is, at an average
price of 101. It is bought back at prices between 100 and 101, that is, at an
averagepriceof100.50.Hence,this“extra”tradeisprofitable,earningaprofitof
101 − 100.50 = 0.50.
A.2. Multiple Predators (Ip ≥ 2)
We saw in the previous example how a single predatory trader has an in-
centive to “front-run” the distressed trader by selling as long as the distressed
trader is selling. With multiple surviving traders this incentive remains, but
another effect is introduced: these predators want to end up with all their capi-
tal in the arbitrage position and they want to buy their shares sooner than the
other strategic traders do.
The proposition below shows that, in equilibrium, predators trade off these
incentivesbysellingforawhileandthenstartbuyingbackbeforethedistressed
traders have finished their liquidation.
PROPOSITION 2: In the unique symmetric equilibrium with Ip ≥ 2 and x(t0) ≥
I p −1
I −1 ¯ x, each distressed trader sells with constant speed A/If o r
x(t0)
A/I periods. Each
predator sells at trading intensity A/If o rτ :=
x(t0)− I p −1
I −1 ¯ x
A/I periods and buys back
shares at a trading intensity of AId
I(I p −1) until t0 +
x(t0)
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where p(t0) = µ + λIx(t0) − λS.Predatory Trading 1839
The proposition shows that price overshooting also occurs in the case of
multiple predators if x(t0)i slarge relative to ¯ x.15 This is because the preda-
tors strategically sell excessively at first, and start buying relatively late.
It is instructive to consider why it cannot be an equilibrium that there is no
price overshooting and predators start buying back already at time t  < t0 + τ
when the price reaches its long-run level. To see that, suppose all predators
start buying back at time t . Then, if a single predator deviated and postponed
buying, the price would continue to fall after t . Hence, this deviating predator
could buy back his position cheaper after other traders have completed their
liquidations, and hence, increase his profit.
The equilibrium has the property that, from each predator’s perspective,
X−i(t) (the total asset holdings of other strategic traders) is declining until
t0 + τ and is constant thereafter. Since predator i also sells until t0 + τ, aggre-
gate stock holdings X(t) and the price overshoot.
The price overshooting is lower if there are more predators since more preda-
tors behave more competitively:
PROPOSITION 3: Keep constant the fraction, Ip/I, of predators, the total arbitrage
capacity, I ¯ x, and the total initial stock holding, Ix(t0), and assume that Ix(t0) ≥
I p¯ x. Then, the price overshooting
(i) is strictly positive for all nonzero Ip < ∞;
(ii) is decreasing in the number of predators Ip; and,
(iii) approaches zero as Ip approaches inﬁnity.
Numerical example.W e consider cases with a total number of traders I = 3,
9, and 27. For each case, we assume that a third of the traders are in dis-
tress, that is, Id/I = 1/3. As in the previous example, we let λ = 1, µ = 140, S =
40, t0 = 5, T = 7, the total trading speed be A = 20, the total initial holding be
x(t0)I = 16, and the total trader holding capacity be ¯ xI = 20. Figure 3 (Panel
A) illustrates the asset holdings of predators and Figure 3 (Panel B) shows the
price dynamics.
We see that there is a substantial price overshooting when the number of
predators is small, and that the overshooting is decreasing as the number
15 We assume that all strategic traders’ positions at t0 are the same, that is, x i(t0) = x(t0)∀i. The
analysis extends to a setting in which strategic traders hold different positions at t0.I nsuch a
setting the equilibrium strategies are described as follows: initially, all predators and distressed
sellers sell at full speed
A
I . Hence, each trader’s X−i is declining. When X −i(t) = X −i(T) = ¯ x(Ip − 1)
for the strategic trader with the smallest initial position x i(t0), all predators start repurchasing
shares at a speed of
Id
I[Ip −1] A. Note that this speed guarantees that each predator’s X−i is flat.
When the predator with the highest x(t0)r e a c h es his final holding ¯ x,h es tops buying shares and
the remaining predators increase their trading intensity to
Id
I[(Ip −1)−1] A. Similarly, as predators
complete their repurchases, the remaining predators adjust their trading speed to
Id
I[Iremaining −1] A.
Interestingly, for fixed aggregate holdings of all predators at t0,t he price overshooting increases
with the dispersion of the initial holdings. To see this, note that the length of the initial selling
spree is determined by the predator with the smallest initial position xi(t0), whose X−i(t0)i sthe







































Figure 3. Holdings (Panel A) and price dynamics (Panel B) with multiple predators.
The solid line shows each predator’s holdings xi(t) and the price dynamics for the case in which
two predators prey on one distressed trader. The dashed line shows holdings and prices when six
predatorspreyonthreedistressedtraders.Thedottedlinescorrespondtothecasewith18predators
and 9 distressed traders. As the number of predators increases, the predators start buying back
earlier and the price overshooting decreases.
of predators increases. With more predators, the competitive pressure to buy
shares early is larger. Hence, the liquidation cost for a distressed trader is de-
creasing in the number of predators (even holding the total trading capacity
fixed).
Collusion. The predators can profit from collusion. In particular, they could
increase their revenue from predation by selling until the troubled traders
were finished liquidating and only then start rebuilding their positions. Hence,
through collusion, the predators could jointly act like a single predator (with
the slight modification that multiple predators have more capital). Collusive
and noncollusive outcomes are qualitatively different. A collusive outcome is
characterized by predators buying shares only after the troubled traders have
left the market and by a large price overshooting. In contrast, a noncollusive
outcome is characterized by predators buying all the shares they need by the
time the troubled traders have finished liquidating and by a relatively smaller
price overshooting.
Collusion could potentially occur through an explicit arranged agreement or
implicitly without arrangement, called “tacit” collusion. Tacit collusion means
that the collusive outcome is the equilibrium in a noncooperative game. In our
model, tacit collusion cannot occur. However, if strategic traders could observe
(or infer) each others’ trading activity, then tacit collusion might arise because
predators could “punish” a predator that deviates from the collusive strategy.16
16 If traders could observe each others’ trades, then we would have to change our definition of
strategies and equilibrium accordingly. A rigorous analysis of such a model is beyond the scope of
this paper.Predatory Trading 1841
Large amounts of sidelined capacity, ¯ x − x(t0). Proposition 2 states that
predatory trading and the overshooting occur as long as traders’ initial holding
is large enough relative to their position limit, that is, x(t0) ≥ I p −1
I −1 ¯ x. Proposi-
tion 2  analyzes the complementary case in which x(t0) < Ip −1
I −1 ¯ x, that is, the
capacity on the sideline is large relative to the selling of the distressed traders.
Since the amount of available (sidelined) capacity is large, the competitive pres-
sure among undistressed traders to buy shares overwhelms the incentive to
front-run, and therefore there is no predatory trading. Instead, undistressed
traders start buying immediately.
PROPOSITION 2 : In the unique symmetric equilibrium with Ip ≥ 2 and x(t0) <
I p −1
I −1 ¯ x, each distressed trader sells with constant speed A/I. Each predator buys
initially at the high trading intensity of A(I + Id)
I P I for τ :=−
(I −1)x(t0)−(I p −1)¯ x
A(1− I + Id
I pI ) peri-
ods and goes on buying at the lower trading intensity of AId
I(I p −1) until t0 +
x(t0)
A/I .
The price is increasing.
In Section V we study the equilibrium determination of x(t0) and show that
x(t0)i ss olarge that predatory trading happens with positive probability.
B. Endogenous Distress, Systemic Risk, and Risk Management
So far, we have assumed that certain strategic traders fall into financial
distress,withoutspecifyingtheunderlyingcause.Inthissection,weendogenize
distress and study how predatory activity can lead to contagious default events.
We assume that a trader must liquidate if his wealth drops to a threshold
level W
¯
. This is because of margin constraints, risk management, or other
considerations in connection with low wealth. Trader i’s wealth at t consists of
hisposition,xi(t),oftheassetthatouranalysisfocuseson,aswellaswealthheld
in other assets Oi(t). That is, his mark-to-market wealth is Wi(t) = xi(t)p(t) +
Oi(t). The value of the other holdings, Oi(t), is subject to an exogenous shock at
time t0, which can be observed by all traders. At other times, Oi(t)i sconstant.
Obviously, if the wealth shock  Oi at t0 is so negative that Wi(t0) ≤ W
¯
, the
trader is immediately in distress and must liquidate. Smaller negative shocks
that result in Wi(t0) > W
¯
can, however, also lead to an endogenous distress,
since the potential selling behavior of predators and other distressed traders
may erode the wealth of trader i even further. A trader who knows that he must
liquidate in the future finds it optimal to start selling already at time t0 because
he foresees the price decline caused by the selling pressure of other strategic
traders.Interestingly,whetheranagentanticipateshavingtoliquidatedepends
on the number of other agents who are expected to be in distress. As in the
previous sections, we consider the set Id of liquidating traders.
We let W
¯
(Id)b ethe maximum wealth at t0 such that trader i cannot avoid
financial distress if Id traders are expected to be in distress. More precisely, for




Wi(t, ai, a−i) ≤ W
¯
, (21)
where a−i has Id − 1 strategies of liquidating and I − Id strategies of preying





definition, suppose trader i expects that Id − 1 other traders will be in distress
with resulting selling pressure. Further, he expects that I − Id other traders
will act as predators, preying with a vigor that corresponds to Id defaults. That
is, the predators sell in anticipation of all of the defaults including trader i’s
own default. If, under these circumstances, trader i will sooner or later be in
default no matter what he does, then his wealth is less than W
¯
(Id).
With this definition of W
¯
(Id), it follows directly that—in an equilibrium17
in which Id traders immediately liquidate and Ip = I − Id traders prey as in
Propositions 1, 2, and 2 —every distressed trader i ∈ Id has wealth Wi(t0) ≤
W
¯
(Id), and every predator i ∈ I p has wealth Wi(t0) > W
¯
(Id).
Interestingly, the higher the expected number, Id,o fdistressed traders, the
higher is the “survival hurdle” W
¯
(Id).
PROPOSITION 4: The more traders are expected to be in distress, the harder it is
to survive. That is, W
¯
(Id) is increasing in Id.
This insight follows from two facts: first, even without predatory trading, a
higher number of distressed traders leads to more sell-offs and a larger price
decline, thereby eroding each trader’s wealth. Second, a higher number of dis-
tressed traders also makes predation more fierce since there are fewer compet-
ing predators and more prey to exploit. This fierce predation lowers the price
even further, making survival more difficult.
Proposition 4 is useful in understanding systemic risk. Financial regula-
tors are concerned that the financial difficulty of one or two large traders
can drag down many more investors, thereby destabilizing the financial sec-
tor. Our framework helps explain why this spillover effect occurs. To see this,














(4)]. The three remaining traders (D, E, and F) have enough reserves
to fight off any crisis, that is, their wealth is above W
¯
(I).
With these wealth levels, the unique equilibrium is such that no strategic
trader is in distress and all of them immediately start to increase their position
from x(t0)t o¯ x.T osee this, note first that it cannot be an equilibrium that one
agent defaults. If one agent is expected to default, no one defaults because no
one has wealth below W
¯
(1). Similarly, it is not an equilibrium that two traders
default, because only trader A has wealth below W
¯
(2), and so on.
17 There may be other kinds of equilibria in which a surviving trader does not prey because
of fear of driving himself in distress. For ease of exposition, we do not consider these equilibria.
Equilibria of the form that we consider exist under certain conditions on the initial holdings and
wealth levels.Predatory Trading 1843
Figure 4. Systemic risk in setting with endogenous distress. This figure shows the wealth
levels of traders A,...,E and several survival hurdles W
¯
(Id), that is, the wealth necessary to
survive if the market believes that Id traders will be in distress. In Panel A, traders’ wealth levels
are high enough that all traders survive in the unique equilibrium. In Panel B, trader D is in
distress because of a wealth shock. This leads to predatory trading which can drag traders A, B,
and C into distress too.
On the other hand, if trader D faces a wealth shock at t0 such that W D(t0) <
W
¯
,h ecan drag down traders A, B, and C, as shown in Figure 4 (Panel B). If
it is expected that four traders will be in distress, then traders A, B, C, and D
will liquidate their position since their wealth is below W
¯
(4). Intuitively, the
fact that trader D is forced to liquidate his position encourages predation and
the price is depressed. This, in turn, brings three other traders into financial
difficulty. This situation captures the notion of systemic risk. The financial
difficulty of one trader endangers the financial stability of three other traders.
In the economy of Figure 4 (Panel B), there are also other equilibria in which
1, 2, or 3 traders face distress. For instance, it is an equilibrium that only
trader D liquidates, since if everybody expects that only trader D will go under,
traders A, B, C, E, and F prey only briefly and buy back after a short while.
The predation is less fierce in this equilibrium in the sense that predators start
repurchasing shares earlier (i.e., the turning point t0 + τ occurs earlier).
In the case of multiple equilibria, interesting coordination issues arise: a
widespreadcrisiscanbecausedbycoordinatedsellingbypredatorsorby“panic”
selling by vulnerable traders. For example, it could be that neither trader E nor
trader F alone can cause trader A’s distress, but that the joint selling of E and
F will push the price sufficiently down to drive A into financial distress.
Alternatively, suppose C expects A and B to be selling along with aggressive
trading by predators. Then, C will sell himself, and this panic selling by C
will in turn warrant the selling by A and B. Alternatively, if A, B, and C could
coordinate on not panicking, then selling is not warranted and the widespread
crisis will be avoided.
We note that the multiplicity in our example does not arise when trader E
also faces a wealth shock at t0 such that W E(t0) < W
¯
(1). In this case, at least
two traders must liquidate, which drives A into default since A has wealth less
than W
¯
(2).Hence,atleastthreetradersmustliquidate,whichmakespredation1844 TheJ ournal of Finance
yet fiercer and drives B into default. Similarly, this results in C’s default, and
we see that the “ripple-effect” equilibrium is unique in this case.
The dangers of systemic risk in financial markets provide an argument for
intervention by regulatory bodies such as central banks. A bailout of one or
two traders or even only a coordination effort can stabilize prices and ensure
the survival of numerous other vulnerable traders. However, it also spoils the
profit opportunity for the remaining predators who would otherwise benefit
from the financial crisis. From an ex ante perspective, the anticipation of crisis-
preventive action by the central bank reduces the systemic risk of the financial
sector, and hence, traders are more willing to exploit arbitrage opportunities.
This reduces initial mispricings, but it could also worsen agency problems not
considered here.
Inlightofourmodel,the1987crashcanbeviewedasanexampleofpredatory
trading enhancing systemic risk. The Brady Report (Brady et al. (1988)) argues
that an initial price decline triggered price insensitive selling by institutions
thatfollowedportfolioinsurancetradingstrategies.Thisencouragedaggressive
trading-oriented institutions to sell. That is, they preyed on portfolio insurance
traders. Less informed long-term traders did not step in to provide liquidity
since they underestimated the amount of uninformed trading—portfolio insur-
ance trading and predatory trading—and interpreted it as informed selling.
The latter point is emphasized by Grossman (1988) and Gennotte and Leland
(1990).
Risk management. The 1987 crash also illustrates the danger of using a rigid
risk management strategy that is known to certain other strategic traders. It is
preferable to keep the risk management strategy confidential and sufficiently
flexible.
The systemic risk in our model implies that risk management should take
into consideration other traders’ exposures and financial soundness. Indeed,
JP Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank have recently started conducting “dealer
exit stress tests” in which a bank estimates “the impact on its own book caused
by a rival being forced to withdraw” (Jeffery (2003)).
Further, the less liquid the security (i.e., the higher λ), the larger is the price
decline due to predatory trading and the associated wealth deterioration. For-
mally, this means that W
¯
(Id)i sincreasing in λ. Consequently, a fund with
illiquid assets must have a careful risk management strategy.
Also, the risk management strategy should take into account that asset cor-
relations can be different during a liquidity crisis because price movements are
caused by distressed selling and predatory trading rather than fundamental
news. Suppose, for example, that the risky asset represents a long-short posi-
tion in securities with identical cash flows. These securities will move together
in normal times, but during a liquidity crisis their prices can depart as repre-
sented by p(t) declining in our model. Hence, a seemingly perfect hedge based
on fundamentals can cause losses during a crisis as the mispricing widens,
forcing a trader to liquidate at the least favorable terms. Risk managers shouldPredatory Trading 1845
be aware that the past empirical correlation structure might ignore possible
predatory trading attacks and separate stress tests are needed to account for
predation risk.
A fund’s wealth might not only suffer from selling illiquid assets, but also
from fund outflows. The risk of fund outflows effectively increases the fund’s
ultimate survival threshold W
¯
and makes it even more vulnerable to predatory
trading. Hence, open-end funds are more subject to predatory trading than
closed-end funds and, consequently, should hold more liquid assets.
Furthermore,traderswhoholdilliquidassetsmightbeunabletoseekoutside
financing to bridge temporary liquidity needs. This is because the trader may
have to reveal his position and trading strategy to possible creditors, such as
the trader’s brokers, exposing him to predatory trading.
Finally, risk management should take into account the way in which assets
are marked-to-market. Suppose, for instance, that a position is financed by
collateralized loan by a broker, who can sell the asset if margin requirements
are not met. Then, the broker has some discretion in setting the price used
to mark the position to market if the market is highly illiquid. Hence, the
broker can enhance the trader’s problems by marking-to-market aggressively
and forcing a fire-sale of the illiquid asset, depressing the price and causing
losses for the distressed trader. The broker may have an incentive to do this in
order to be able to sell the collateral early.18 An illustrative example is the case
of Granite Partners (Askin Capital Management), who held very illiquid fixed-
income securities. Its main brokers—Merrill Lynch, DLJ, and others—gave the
fund less than 24 hours to meet a margin call. Merrill Lynch and DLJ then
allegedly sold off collateral assets at below market prices at an insider-only
auction in which bids were solicited from a restricted number of other brokers
excluding retail institutional investors.
Extensions.I n our perfect information setting, all traders know how the equi-
librium will play out at the instant after t0. That is, they know the entire future
price path as well as the number of predators Ip and victims Id.I namore com-
plex setting in which traders’ wealth shocks are not perfectly observable and
the price process is noisy, this need not be the case. A trader might start selling
shares not knowing when the price decline stops. He might expect to act as a
predator but may actually end up as prey.
Finally, while in our equilibrium all vulnerable traders start liquidating their
position from t0 onwards, one sometimes observes that these traders miss the
opportunity to reduce their position early. This exacerbates the predation prob-
lem, since a delayed reaction on the part of the distressed traders allows the
predators to front-run as discussed in Section VI.A. The phenomenon of de-
layed reaction by vulnerable traders may be explained in an enriched version
of our framework. First, if prices are fluctuating, the trader might “gamble for
resurrection” by not selling early, in the hope that a positive price shock will
18 Futures exchanges can also induce predatory trading by imposing tighter margin constraints.1846 TheJ ournal of Finance
liberate him from financial distress. Second, if selling activity cannot be kept
secret, a desire to appear solvent might prevent a troubled trader from selling
early.
IV. Valuation with Endogenous Liquidity
Predatory trading has implications for valuation of large positions. We con-
sider three levels of valuation with increasing emphasis on the position’s
liquidity:
DEFINITION 2:
(i) The “paper value” of a position x at time t is Vpaper(t, x) = xp(t);
(ii) the “orderly liquidation value” is V orderly(t, x) = x[p(t) − 1
2λx]; and,
(iii) the “distressed liquidation value”, Vdistressed(t, x, Ip), is the revenue raised
in equilibrium when Ip predators are preying.
The paper value is the simple mark-to-market value of the position. The
orderly liquidation value is the revenue raised in a secret liquidation, taking
intoaccountthefactthatthedemandcurveisdownwardsloping.Thedownward
sloping demand curve implies that liquidation makes the price drop by λx,
resulting in an average liquidation price of p(t) − 1
2λx.
The distressed liquidation value takes into account not only the downward
sloping demand curve, but also the strategic interaction between traders and,
specifically,thecostsofpredation.WenotethatVdistressed dependsonthecharac-
teristics of the market such as the number of predators, the number of troubled
traders, and their initial holdings. For instance, the distressed valuation of a
position declines if other traders also face financial difficulty.
Clearly, the orderly liquidation value is lower than the paper value. The
distressed liquidation value is even lower if the predators have initially large
positions.
PROPOSITION 5: If x(t0) ≥
√
I p(I p −1)
I −1 ¯ x, then
V paper(t0, x(t0)) > V orderly(t0, x(t0)) > V distressed(t0, x(t0), Ip).
The low distressed liquidation value is a consequence of predation. In par-
ticular, predation causes the price to initially drop much faster than what is
warranted by the distressed trader’s own sales. Hence, the market is endoge-
nously more illiquid when a distressed trader needs liquidity the most.
It is interesting to consider what happens as the number of predators grows,
keeping constant their total size. More predators implies that their behavior
is more similar to that of a price-taking agent. This more competitive behav-
ior makes predation less fierce, reduces the price overshooting, and increases
the distressed liquidation value. As the number of predators grows, the price
overshootingdisappears(Proposition3).Importantly,however,eveninthelimitPredatory Trading 1847
withinfinitelymanypredators,thedistressedliquidationvalueisstrictlylower
than the orderly liquidation value. This is because predatory trading makes the
price drop faster than without predatory trading, implying that the distressed
traders sell most of their shares at the low price.
PROPOSITION 6: Keep constant the fraction of predators, Ip/I, the total arbitrage
capital, I ¯ x, andthetotalinitialholding,Ix(t0),andsupposethat x(t0) ≥ ¯ x
√
I p/I.
Then, the total distressed liquidation value, IdVdistressed, is increasing in the
numberofpredators,Ip.InthelimitasIp approachesinﬁnity,thetotaldistressed
liquidation revenue remains strictly smaller than the total orderly liquidation
value,




If the predators’ initial position x(t0)i slow relative to their capacity ¯ x, then
the distressed liquidation value can be greater than the orderly liquidation
value. This is because, in this case, the announcement of a distressed liquida-
tion will cause the other traders to compete for the shares and immediately
start buying (Proposition 2 ). Hence, announcing an intention to sell—called
sunshine trading—is profitable if there is enough available capacity on the
sideline among relevant investors; otherwise, it will cause predatory trading.
V. The Investment Phase (t ∈ [0, t0])
Sofar,wehavetakenasgiventheposition,x(t0),thatstrategictraderswantto
acquirepriortot0.Here,weendogenizex(t0)andtherebydeterminethecapacity
¯ x − x(t0) that traders leave on the sideline to reduce their risk exposure or to
be able to exploit cheap buying opportunities that may arise later. We show
that the sidelined capacity in equilibrium is so small that predatory trading
has to occur with strictly positive probability, and we study how x(t0) depends
on disclosure policies.
For simplicity, we assume that with probability π,arandomly chosen trader
isindistress(Id =1),andwithprobability1−π,notraderisindistress(Id = 0).
Note that this implies that the risk of distress is exogenous and independent
of the position size. The strategic traders’ initial position at time 0—when they
learn of the arbitrage opportunity—is assumed to be 0. To separate the invest-
ment phase from the predatory phase, we assume that the time, t0,o fpossible
financial distress is sufficiently late, that is, t0 > ¯ x
A/I.
Proposition 7 describes the initial trading by large strategic investors.
PROPOSITION 7: First, all traders buy at the rate A/I until they have accumulated
a position of x(t0). If I > 2 and a distressed trader’s position is not disclosed,
















If a trader is distressed at t0, then x(t0) is so large—with or without disclosure—
that the remaining strategic traders use the predatory strategies described in
Propositions 1 and 2.I fn oone is in distress at t0, then all traders buy at the
rate A/I until they reach their capacity ¯ x.
All traders have an initial desire to buy their preferred position x(t0) without
anydelaysincetheacquisitionsbyothertradersincreasetheprice.Importantly,
itisthisdesireofthetraderstoquicklyacquirealargepositionthatlaterleaves
them vulnerable to predation.
The optimal position x(t0) balances the costs and benefits associated with the
three possible outcomes after t0: (i) no trader faces distress, (ii) another trader
faces distress, and (iii) the trader himself faces distress. In case (i) all traders
immediately start buying additional shares and the price increases after t0.I n
the other two cases, the behavior of the surviving strategic traders depends on
the position size x(t0). For x(t0) ≥ Ip −1
I −1 ¯ x, they sell and prey on the distressed
trader as described in Propositions 1 and 2, while for x(t0) < Ip −1
I −1 ¯ x, they buy
assets and provide liquidity as outlined in Proposition 2 .
Proposition 7 shows that x(t0) ≥ Ip −1
I −1 ¯ x, which implies that predatory trading
is an inherent part of equilibrium. To see why, suppose to the contrary that x(t0)
is so small that there is always enough available capital to absorb a distressed
trader’spositionasdescribedinProposition2 .Then,thepriceincreasesaftert0
not only in case (i), but also if a trader is in distress as in (ii) and (iii). Therefore,
in all three cases, a trader would profit from having built up a larger position
prior to t0, and this is inconsistent with equilibrium.
In fact, it is a general result, beyond our specific assumptions, that in any
equilibrium, predatory trading occurs with positive probability. The general
argument is that keeping capacity on the sideline has opportunity costs, which
must be offset by profits earned during a crisis with capital shortage. Hence,
such a “liquidity crisis” must happen with positive probability and predatory
trading is profitable during a liquidity crisis.
Further, Proposition 7 determines x(t0) exactly and shows how it depends
on the granularity of disclosure. If agents anticipate that their position will
be disclosed when in distress, then they choose smaller initial positions, that
is, (1 − π
I −1)¯ x < (1 − π
I )¯ x. This is because disclosure makes it more costly to
liquidate a larger position because predators will prey more fiercely (i.e., start
buying at a later time τ).Predatory Trading 1849
The link between disclosure and predation risk is relevant more generally,
that is, even if disclosure is not tied directly to the distress event. Enforcing
strict disclosure rules concerning a fund’s security positions or risk manage-
ment strategy can increase the fund’s exposure to predation risk. This helps
explain the secrecy of large hedge funds and why they deal with multiple
brokers and banks to reduce the amount of sensitive information known by
each counterparty. Consistently, IAFE Invertor Risk Committee (IRC) (2001)
emphasizes that disclosure increases predation risk for hedge funds and favors
less stringent disclosure rules for large funds. The risk of predation is reduced
if the disclosure pertains only to portfolio characteristics and not to specific
positions, or if the disclosure is delayed in time.
Also, our analysis suggests that any disclosed information should be dis-
persed as broadly as possible in order to minimize the implications of preda-
tory trading since, with more strategic traders, predation is less fierce. Also,
a public disclosure could be helpful if it could attract liquidity from long-term
traders by creating attention and convincing them that a selling pressure was
due to distress, not due to adverse information about the security. While this
is outside our model, attracting long-term traders might flatten their demand
curve (i.e., lower λ).
VI. Further Implications of Predatory Trading
A. Front-Running
Sofar,wehaveconsideredequilibriainwhichthedistressedtraderssellatthe
same time as the predators. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some cases,
the predators are selling before the distressed trader. That is, the predators
are truly front-running. There are various potential reasons for the delayed
selling by the distressed traders. They might hope that they will face a positive
wealth shock that will allow them to overcome the financial difficulty and avoid
liquidation costs. Alternatively, the distressed trader may not be aware that the
predator—for instance, the trader’s own investment bank—is preying on him.
Finally, the predators could simply have an ability to trade faster. In any case,
front-running makes predation even more profitable.
The equilibrium with a single predator is simple: first, the predator sells as
much as possible. Then, he waits for the distressed trader to depress the price
by liquidating his position, and finally the predator repurchases his position.
Clearly, the price overshoots, and the predation makes liquidation costly.
The equilibrium with many predators can also easily be analyzed within our
framework. Suppose that at time t0 it is clear that Id traders are in financial
distress and that these traders start selling at time t1, where t1 > t0 + IdI p
A(I p −1) ¯ x.
The predatory trading plays out as follows: first, the predators front-run
by selling. This leads to a large price drop. When the distressed traders start
selling, the predators start buying back, and the price recovers to its new equi-
librium level.1850 TheJ ournal of Finance
PROPOSITION 8: In the unique symmetric equilibrium with Ip ≥ 2 and x(t0) ≥
I p −1
I −1 ¯ x, each distressed trader sells with constant speed A/If o r
x(t0)
A/I periods
starting at time t1. Each predator starts selling from t0 onwards at trading in-
tensity A/Ip for τ :=
(I −1)x(t0)− ¯ x(I p −1)




I p −1 from t1 onwards. That is,
ai∗(t) =

    
    
−A/I p for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ),
0 for t ∈ [t0 + τ, t1),
AId











The price overshoots; the price dynamics are
p∗(t) =

    
    
p(t0) − λA[t − t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ),
p(t0) − λAτ for t ∈ [t0 + τ, t1),
p(t0) − λAτ + λ A
I
Id











where p(t0) = µ + λIx(t0) − λS. The ability to front-run by predators im-
plies larger liquidation costs for distressed traders and greater price over-
shooting.
Changes in the composition of main stock indices force index funds to rebal-
ance their portfolios to minimize their tracking errors. While prior to 1989
changes in the composition of the S&P occurred without prior notice, from
1989 onwards they were announced 1 week in advance. The price dynamics
during these intermediate weeks suggest that index tracking funds rebalance
their portfolio around the inclusion/deletion date, while strategic traders front-
run by trading immediately after the announcement. In particular, Lynch and
Mendenhall(1997)documentasharppricerise(drop)ontheannouncementday,
acontinuedrise(decline)untiltheactualinclusion(deletion),andapartialprice
reversal on the days following the inclusion (deletion). Hence, consistent with
our model’s predictions, there appears to be front-running and price overshoot-
ing. If index tracking funds start rebalancing their portfolios at the time of the
indexinclusion,thenourmodelreplicatesexactlythedocumentedstylizedprice
pattern. However, high observed trading volume on the day prior to the inclu-
sion (deletion) indicates that many of the index funds trade already prior to this
day. If so, our model would predict that the price reversal occurs the day before
inclusion (deletion) unless there is a monopolist strategic trader or traders col-
lude.Wenotethattheobservedpersistenceofpriceovershootingmightpartially
be due to price pressure in the spirit of Grossman and Miller (1988), although
simple price pressure would not explain the price adjustment and large tradingPredatory Trading 1851
volume around the announcement (which, in our model, are caused by front-
running).
B. Batch Auction Markets, Trading Halts, and Circuit Breakers
In this subsection, we study how certain market practices can alleviate the
problem of predatory trading. We consider a setting in which trading is halted,
all of the long-term traders are contacted, and all traders—strategic and long-
term—canparticipateinabatchauction.Hence,whilesharesaretradedcontin-
uously outside the batch auction, blocks can be sold in the auction. We assume
that long-term traders provide a continuum of limit orders, distressed traders
submit market orders for their entire holdings, and predators submit market
orders to maximize profit. After all orders are collected, they are executed at a
single price in the auction, and, thereafter, sequential trading resumes as de-
scribed previously in the paper. Real-world trading halts and circuit breakers
work essentially in this way.
Proposition 9 describes the equilibrium behavior of the predators and the
price dynamics for this setting.
PROPOSITION 9: With x(t0) ≥ I p −1
I −1 ¯ x, each predator submits a buy order of size
I p −1
I p [¯ x − x(t0)] at the batch auction at t0. Thereafter, each predator buys






µ − λS + λ(I p −1)¯ x + λx(t0) at the batch auction at t0










The price overshooting is smaller compared to the setting without batch auction.
In contrast to the sequential market structure, predators do not sell shares.
This is because the batch auction prevents predators from walking down the
demand curve. However, predators are still reluctant to provide liquidity as
long as competitive forces are weak. To see this, note that a single predator
does not participate in the batch auction at all, while in the case of multiple
predators each individual predator’s order size is limited to I p −1
I p [¯ x − x(t0)].
This explains why some price overshooting remains. After the batch auc-
tion, the surviving predators build up their final position x(T) = ¯ x as fast
as possible in continuous trading. Hence, the price gradually increases until
it reaches the same long-run level p(T) = µ − λS + λI p¯ x.I nsummary, the
price overshooting is substantially lower compared to the sequential trad-
ing mechanism and the new long-run equilibrium price is reached more
quickly.1852 TheJ ournal of Finance
C. Bear Raids and the Up-tick Rule
A bear raid is a special form of predatory trading, which was not uncommon
priorto1933accordingtoEiteman,Dice,andEiteman(1966).19 Aringoftraders
identifies and sells short a stock that other investors hold long on their margin
accounts. This depresses the stock’s price and triggers margin calls for the long
investors, who are then forced to sell their shares, further deflating the price.
Based on his (allegedly first-hand) knowledge of these practices, Joe Kennedy,
thefirstheadoftheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC),introducedthe
so-called up-tick rule to prevent bear raids. This rule bans short-sales during
a falling market. In the context of our model, this means that strategic traders
with small initial positions, x(t0), cannot undertake predatory trading. This
reduces the price overshooting and increases the distressed traders’ liquidation
revenue.
D. Contagion
Predatory trading suggests a novel mechanism for financial contagion. Sup-
pose that the strategic traders have large positions in several markets. Further,
suppose that a large strategic trader incurs a loss in one market, bringing this
trader into financial trouble. Then, this large trader must downsize his oper-
ations and reduce all his positions. Kyle and Xiong (2001) model this direct
contagion result due to a wealth effect. Our model shows that predatory trad-
ing by other traders amplifies contagion and the price impact in all affected
markets.
This amplification is not driven by a correlation in economic fundamentals
or by information spillovers, but rather by the composition of the holdings of
large traders who must significantly reduce their positions. This insight has
the following empirical implication: a shock to one security, which is held by
large vulnerable traders, may be contagious to other securities that are also
held by the vulnerable traders.
VII. Conclusion
This paper provides a new framework for studying the phenomenon of preda-
tory trading. Predatory trading is important in connection with large security
trades in illiquid markets. We show that predatory trading leads to price over-
shooting and amplifies a large trader’s liquidation cost and default risk. Hence,
the risk management strategy of large traders should account for “predation
risk.” Predatory trading enhances systemic risk, since a financial shock to one
trader may spill over and trigger a crisis for the whole financial sector. Con-
sequently, our analysis provides an argument in favor of coordinated actions
by regulators or bailouts. Our analysis has further implications for the regula-
tion of securities trading and disclosure rules of large traders, and it explains
certain advantages of trading halts, batch auctions, and of the up-tick rule.
19 The origin of the term “bear” goes back to the 18th century, where it described a trader who

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































[λai(t)X −i(t) + G(ai(t), a−i(t))]dt
 
, (A1)
where the terms with xi(0) do not depend on the trading strategy. Consider a
strategy, a(·), with xi(T) < ¯ x. Since ¯ a ≥ A/I and T > 2¯ xI/A, there must be an
interval [t , t  ] such that a(t) < ¯ a(t) −   for t ∈ [t , t  ]. Consider another strat-
egy ˆ a which is the same as a except that ˆ a(t) = a(t) +   for t ∈ [t , t  ], implying




 (t   − t )(S − xi(T)) −
1
2
 2(t   − t )2 −






 (t   − t )(S − xi(T) − (I − 1)¯ x) −
1
2
 2(t   − t )2
 
> 0, (A2)
where we use X −i ≤ (I − 1)¯ x. This shows that a is not optimal, and hence, any
optimal strategy must have xi(T) = ¯ x.
Next, consider a strategy with a(t) ≥ ¯ a(t) +   for t ∈ [t , t  + τ ]. (The case with
a(t) < a
¯
(t)i ssimilar.) Then, the profit can be increased by using another strat-
egy ˆ a which is the same as a except that ˆ a(t) = a(t) −   for t ∈ [t , t  + τ ] and
ˆ a(t) = a(t) +   on some other interval [t  , t   + τ ], where a(t) ≤ ¯ a(t) −  . The
change in objective function is
γ τ  − λ
   t +τ 
t 
 X −i(t)dt −




≥  τ   
γ − λ(I − 1)¯ x
 
> 0, (A3)
using 0 ≤ X −i ≤ (I − 1)¯ x. This implies that a is not optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The distressed trader’s strategy is optimal since any
faster liquidation leads to temporary price impact costs.
The surviving trader, i,w ants to minimize
  T
t0 ai(t)X −i(t)dt subject to the
constraints xi(T) = ¯ x and |ai(t)|≤A/I. Here, X−i(t)i sthe position of the trader
in financial trouble, so
X −i(t) =
 
x(t0) − tA/I for t ∈ [t0, t0 + x(t0)I/A],





variable as stated in the proposition. Q.E.D.1856 TheJ ournal of Finance
Proof of Propositions 2 and 2 : Suppose that x(t0) ≥ I p −1
I −1 ¯ x.Adistressed
trader’s strategy is optimal, given the other traders’ actions, since: (i) until
time t0 + τ, the price is falling and the distressed trader is selling as fast as he
can without incurring temporary impact costs; and, (ii) after time t0 + τ, the
priceisrisingandthedistressedtraderissellingattheminimalrequiredspeed.
To see the optimality of a predator’s strategy, suppose, without loss of gen-
erality, that trader i is not the trader in financial distress and that all other
traders are using the proposed equilibrium strategies. Then, the total position,








for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ],
(I p −1)¯ x for t > t0 + τ.
(A5)
Trader i wants to minimize
  T
t0 ai(t)X −i(t)dt subject to the constraints
xi(T) = ¯ x and ai(t) ∈ [a
¯
,¯ a]. Since X−i(t)i sf irst decreasing and then constant,   T
t0 ai(t)X −i(t)dt is minimized by choosing ai = a
¯
as long as X−i(t)i sdecreas-
ing and by choosing a positive ai thereafter. Hence, the ai that is described in
the proposition is optimal. We note that trader i’s objective function does not
depend on the speed with which he buys back after time τ. There is a single
speed, however, which is consistent with the equilibrium.
To prove the uniqueness of this equilibrium, we first note that, in any
symmetric equilibrium, X−i(t) must be (weakly) monotonic. To see this, sup-
pose to the contrary that there exists t , t  , and t    such that t  < t   < t    and
both X−i(t ) < X−i(t  ) and X−i(t  ) > X−i(t   ). Since X−i(t ) < X−i(t  ) and since
the distressed traders are selling, the predators must be buying while X−i(t)
is arbitrarily close to X−i(t  ) (on a set of nonzero measure). Further, since
X−i(t  ) > X−i(t   ), ai(t) < ¯ a for t arbitrarily close to t   . Hence, trader i can de-
crease his trading cost (14) by buying less around X−i(t  ) and more around
X−i(t   ), while incurring no temporary impact costs and keeping xi(T) un-
changed. Similar arguments show that there cannot exist t  < t   < t    such that
X−i(t ) > X−i(t  ) and X−i(t  ) < X−i(t   ).
Next, for x(t0) ≥ Ip −1
I −1 ¯ x, monotonicity of X−i implies that X−i is nonincreasing
since X −i(0) ≥ (Ip − 1)¯ x = X −i(T). It follows directly from Lemma 1 that as
long as X −i(t) > (I p −1)¯ x and t is not too large, an optimal strategy satisfies
ai = a
¯
, that is, ai =− A/I. Hence, ˙ X −i(t) =−A I −1
I until X −i(t) = (Ip − 1)¯ x.
The proof of Proposition 2  is analogous. In this case, each predator’s X−i(t)i s
increasinguntilitreachesitsfinallevel(Ip − 1)¯ x att0 + τ andisflatthereon,in
equilibrium.Thatis,fromt0 + τ onwards,thesellordersofId distressedtraders





p(t0) + λA(t − t0) for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ),





(t − t0 − τ) for t ∈
 









where p(t0) = µ − λ(S − Ix(t0)). Q.E.D.Predatory Trading 1857
Proof of Proposition 3: The size of the overshooting, that is, the difference
between the lowest price (which is achieved at time t0 + τ) and the new equi-
librium price is ¯ xId/(I − 1). This difference decreases toward 0 as the number






  0 (A7)
since ¯ xI and Id/I are constant. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: To show that W
¯
(Id)i sincreasing in Id,w eshow that
the paper wealth, Wi(t, ai, a−i), at any time t is decreasing in Id. The paper
wealth is increasing in the holdings, X−i,o fthe other traders. With higher
Id, more agents are liquidating their entire holdings, reducing X−i. Further, a
higher Id implies that the remaining predators reverse from selling to buying
at a later time τ (defined in Proposition 2), which also reduces X−i.Q .E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Clearly, Vpaper > Vorderly.I fthere is only one preda-
tor, then it follows immediately from Proposition 1 that Vorderly > Vdistressed.I f
therearemultiplepredators,thedistressedliquidationvalueiscomputedusing
Proposition 2. After tedious calculations, the result is











It follows that Vorderly > Vdistressed under the condition stated in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
ProofofProposition6: We firstnotethat x(t0) ≥ ¯ x
√
I p/I impliesthat,forall
I, x(t0) ≥ I p −1
I −1 ¯ x. Hence, Proposition 2 applies and we can use (A8) to compute
the total distressed liquidation value:











Since Ix(t0), Ipx(t0), and Idx(t0) are assumed independent of I, all the terms in
(A9)areindependentofI,excepttheterminvolving(Ip − 1)/(I − 1).Thistermis
increasing in the number of agents, yielding the first result in the proposition.













This value is greater than the orderly liquidation value, Idx(t0)(p(t0) −
1
2λIdx(t0)), under the condition Ix(t0) ≥
√
I pI ¯ x.Q .E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: We give a sketch of the proof. To see the optimality of
trader i’s strategy, we first note that for any value of xi(t0), it is optimal to use1858 TheJ ournal of Finance
the equilibrium strategy after time t0. The argument for this follows from the
proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. Further, prior to t0,i ti soptimal to acquire shares
at a rate of ¯ a until the trader has reached his pre-t0 target. This follows from
the incentive to acquire the position before other traders drive up the price.
The equilibrium level of x(t0)i sderived in the remainder of the proof. We
consider trader i’s expected profit in connection with buying x(t0) +   shares,
given that other traders buy x(t0) shares. More precisely, we use Lemma 1 and
consider how the marginal   shares affect the “trading cost”
 
ai(t)X −i(t)dt.
First, buying   infinitesimal extra shares prior to time t0 costs  (I − 1)x(t0)
since the shares are optimally bought when the other traders have finished
buying and X−i = (I − 1)x(t0).
Thebenefit,aftert0,ofha vingboughtthe sharesdependsonwhether:(i)no
trader is in distress; (ii) another trader is in distress; or, (iii) the trader himself
is in distress, as illustrated below:
(i) If no trader is in distress, then having the extra   shares saves a purchase
attheper-sharecostof X −i = (I − 1)¯ x.Thisisbecausethemarginalshares
are bought in the end when the other I − 1 traders each have acquired a
position of ¯ x.
(ii) If another trader is in financial distress, then having the extra   shares
saves a purchase at the per-share cost of X −i = (I − 2)¯ x. This is the to-
tal position of the other I − 2 predators when the defaulting trader has
liquidated his entire position.
(iii) (a) Suppose I > 2 and the position of the distressed trader is not dis-
closed at time t0. Then, if the trader himself is in financial distress,
the extra   shares can be sold when X −i = (I − 1)¯ x. This is the po-
sition of the predators when one has just finished liquidating. At
that time, the predators have preyed and repurchased their position.
(b) Suppose I = 2o rthat the position of the distressed trader is disclosed
at time t0. Then, if the trader himself is in financial distress, the extra  
shares can be sold when X −i = (I − 2)¯ x.T osee this, note that the extra
shares imply that the predators prey longer (τ larger) because they know
that one must liquidate a larger position. Hence, the marginal shares are
effectively sold at the worst time, when X−i is at its lowest point.
We can now derive the equilibrium x(t0)b yimposing the requirement that
the marginal cost of buying the extra shares equals the marginal benefit. In
the case in which I > 2 and the position of the distressed trader is not disclosed
at time t0,w eh a v e
(I − 1)x(t0) = (1 − π)(I − 1)¯ x + π
I − 1
I
(I − 2)¯ x + π
1
I








¯ x. (A12)Predatory Trading 1859
In the case in which I = 2o rthe position of the distressed trader is disclosed
at time t0,w eh a v e
(I − 1)x(t0) = (1 − π)(I − 1)¯ x + π
I − 1
I
(I − 2)¯ x + π
1
I









The global optimality of buying x(t0) shares is seen as follows. First, buy-
ing fewer shares than x(t0)i snot optimal since the infra-marginal shares are
bought cheaper (in terms of X−i) than (I − 1)x(t0) and their expected benefits
are at least (I − 1)x(t0). Second, buying more shares than x(t0) costs (I − 1)x(t0)
per share, and the expected benefit of these additional shares is at most
(I − 1)x(t0).
Finally, we have to show that in both cases, x0 > Ip −1
I −1 ¯ x, which implies that
after t0 predatory trading occurs as described in Proposition 1 or 2. For the
case in which the position is disclosed, this follows from x(t0) = (1 − π
I −1)¯ x ≥
(1 − 1
I −1)¯ x = Ip−1
I −1 ¯ x. This is also sufficient for the other case since then x(t0)i s
larger. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof of this proposition follows directly from the
insight that from each predator’s viewpoint, X−i declines with a constant slope
I p −1
I p Aandstaysflatassoonasitreachesitsfinallevel X −i(T) = (I p −1)¯ x.That
front-running implies more costly liquidation and greater price overshooting
follows from: (i) each predator has a smaller position at all times; and, (ii) the
lowest total holding of all agents (at time t1)i sstrictly lower. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: The execution price for trader i’s order of ui shares
in the batch auction is pa(ui) = µ − λS + λ(Ip − 1)(x(t0) + u) + λ(x(t0) + ui)i fa l l
defaulting traders submit sell orders of size x(t0) and all other predators submit
individual buy orders of u, where u is to be determined. Since X−i is increasing
after the auction, trader i optimally buys the remaining [¯ x − x(t0) − ui] shares
at the highest trading intensity A/Ip.I fui ≥ u, these buy orders are executed at
an average price of pa + 1
2λI p[¯ x − x(t0) − ui]. Deriving the total cost and taking
the first-order condition w.r.t. ui (evaluated at ui = u) yields an optimal auction
order of ui = I p −1
I p [¯ x − x(t0)]. If ui < u, then predator i must buy more shares
after the auction than the other predators. The first u shares are bought at an
average price of pa + 1
2λI p[¯ x − x(t0) − u] and the last u − ui ones are bought at
an average price of pa + λI p[¯ x − x(t0) − u] + 1
2λ(u − ui). Taking the first-order
condition w.r.t. ui evaluated at ui = u,w ef ind the same optimality condition as
above: ui = u = I p −1
I p [¯ x − x(t0)].
The equilibrium auction price is pa = µ − λS + λ(I p −1)¯ x + λx(t0). The price
overshooting is λ(¯ x − x(t0)), which is smaller than the price overshooting1860 TheJ ournal of Finance
without batch auction, λ Id
I −1 ¯ x for Ip ≥ 2, and λ¯ x for Ip = 1 (Propositions 1 and
2, respectively). Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Noisy Asset Supply
To motivate our focus on equilibria in which strategies only depend on time
(and potential distress), we consider in this section an economy with observable
prices and temporary impact costs and add the realistic assumption that there
is noise in the supply of assets. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, unexpected
price changes are exclusively attributed to the supply noise, and, therefore, the
observability of prices does not alter the model’s properties. To demonstrate
this, we explicitly introduce supply uncertainty in a way that preserves the
benchmark model’s qualitative features. Then, we show that our equilibrium is
also unaffected by the observability of temporary impact costs. We only sketch
the analysis, ignoring certain technical difficulties associated with continuous-
time differential games.
We assume that the supply, St,i saBrownian motion with volatility σ, that
is,
dSt = σ dWt, (B1)












where A is the set of {Ft}-adapted processes20 and {Ft} is generated by the price
process {pt}, the distress indicator Ip1(t≥t0), and G(ai(t), a−i(t)). The price is de-
fined as before by p(t) = µ − λ(St − X(t)), where S0 > ¯ xI.W euse the definition



















ai(t)[¯ p(t) − p(t)]dt.
(B3)
The first term on the right-hand side is the same as the objective function
with a constant supply of S0. Hence, this term is maximized by the equilibrium
strategy if all other agents use the equilibrium strategy. The second term is, as
20 We ignore that one may need to restrict the set of feasible strategies, for example, to functions
of time and current state variables, to have well-defined outcomes for continuous-time differential
games.Predatory Trading 1861













ai(t)[ST − St]dt − λE



















If we assume that the agent must choose a strategy with ¯ x = xT = x0 +   T
0 ai(t)dt, then the last term is 0 since
  T
0 ai(t)dt = ¯ x − x0 is constant and
E(ST − S0) = 0. This assumption means that the agent must end up fully in-
vested in the asset. We note that the agent would optimally choose xT = ¯ x as
long as the supply is not too small. We further note that the supply is close to
S0 with large probability if σ is small.
Even if we do not impose the additional assumption that xT = ¯ x,w ec a n
show that the equilibrium in the model without supply uncertainty is an
ε-equilibrium in the model with noisy supply. (See Radner (1980) for a dis-
cussion of ε-equilibria.) This property of the strategies follows from the fact
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≤ AT E|ST − S0|
= ATσE|WT − W0|
→ 0a sσ → 0.
(B5)
Hence, agent i’s maximal gain from deviating from the strategy of the non-noisy
game approaches 0 as the supply uncertainty vanishes (σ → 0).
Finally, if traders observe their own temporary impact costs, they could in
principle learn about other traders’ actions. In our equilibrium, however, no
trader can alter any other trader’s temporary impact cost. To see this, first note
that when traders are selling, each trader sells at an intensity of A/I, and no
one incurs temporary impact costs. If one trader would deviate and sell faster,
then he would incur a temporary impact cost, but no one else would incur this
cost. (This follows from the definition of the impact cost function G(ai, a−i).)
The same is true when traders are buying back. This means that no trader has
an incentive to deviate: a deviation would not be detected and, therefore, the1862 TheJ ournal of Finance
other traders would continue to trade the same way as otherwise, which would
make the deviation unprofitable.
In conclusion, this section shows that our equilibrium can be seen as a per-
fect equilibrium in a setting in which prices and one’s own temporary impacts
costs are observable. This is because agents cannot learn from prices when
supply is noisy, and because they cannot learn from temporary impact costs in
our equilibrium. (They could only learn from temporary impact costs if two or
more agents were to deviate simultaneously, but when contemplating to devi-
ate, each agent assigns zero probability that other agents deviate at the same
time.) Q.E.D.
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